

RECONCILE/FAO

**IMPACT OF CONFLICT ON PASTORAL COMMUNITIES' RESILIENCE
IN THE HORN OF AFRICA:**

Case Studies from Ethiopia, Kenya and Uganda

REPORT

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Acronyms

ACF	Action Contra la' Faim
AFD	Action for Development
ALRMP	Arid Lands Resource Management Project
ASALs	Arid and Semi-Arid Lands
ASE	Agri-Service Ethiopia
CBOs	Community-Based Organizations
CECORE	Centre for Conflict Resolution
CORDAID	Catholic Organization for Relief and Development Aid
DPC	District Peace Committee
EAPDA	Ethiopian Agro-Pastoralist Development Association
ECHO	European Commission Humanitarian Aid Office
FAO	Food and Agriculture Organization of the United Nations
FAOKEN	FAO Country Representative in Kenya
FGDs	Focus Group Discussions
GPDI	Gayo Pastoral Development Initiative
HoA	Horn of Africa
LVIA	Lay Volunteers International Association
MC	Mercy Corps
MID-P	Merti Integrated Development Programme
MONARLIP	Moroto Nakapiripirit Religious leaders Initiative for Peace
NGOs	Non-Governmental Organizations
NSE	National Steering Committee on Peace-building and Conflict Management
OPA	Oromia Pastoral Association
OPaDC	Oromia Pastoral Areas Development Commission
RECONCILE	Resource Conflict Institute
PCDP	Pastoralist Community Development Project
PREMAP	Pastoralist Resource Management and Advocacy Programme
PWH&E	Pastoralist Women for Health and Education
SALF	Somali Abo Liberation Front
SC-USA	Save the Children United States
TIP	Teso Initiative for Peace
USAID	United States of Agency for International Development
WVE	World Vision Ethiopia

1. Introduction

In December 2011, the Food and Agriculture Organization of the United Nations (FAO) through the office of its Country Representative in Kenya (FAOKEN) commissioned the Resource Conflict Institute (RECONCILE) to undertake a study to demonstrate how conflict impacts on the opportunistic use of rangelands and range resources by pastoralists in the countries of the Horn of Africa. The study, which was based on case studies from purposively selected pastoral locations in Ethiopia, Kenya and Uganda analyzed how rendering certain strategic rangelands inaccessible increases pressures on those resources that are accessible, leading to their overuse and degradation – thereby undermining livelihoods security and engendering even more conflict. It sought to establish and analyze the ripple effects of primary conflict on other areas, resources, and communities that support the population and their livestock. See Box 1 for objectives of the study.

1. Map out the conflicts both spatially and temporally, capturing narratives about the origins of the conflicts and how they have evolved over time; the parties to the conflicts (both primary and secondary), and coverage in terms of area;
2. establish what approaches have been used to try to resolve the conflicts to-date, what institutions have been involved in those initiatives and with what outcomes, explaining reasons for those outcomes;
3. Analyze the impacts of the conflicts on livelihoods of the involved communities and their relationships as well as on the rangelands;
4. Assess whether and to what extent this reality of conflicts is integrated in the development planning and programming by government and other development actors operating in this area;
5. Analyze the local communities' perceptions about the viability of pastoralism and their future as pastoralists in the light of the conflicts; and
6. Recommend holistic strategies and approaches for addressing the conflicts that integrate indigenous knowledge, traditions and systems of the relevant communities.

This is a presentation of the three case studies from Ethiopia, Kenya and Uganda. It is divided into... This first section introduces the study and the case study areas and describes the methodology used as well as the challenges and limitations thereof. Sections two, three and four then present the respective case studies from Ethiopia, Kenya and Uganda with reference to the

objectives of the study as set out in Box herein. Section five identifies the main conclusions and recommendations of the study from a regional perspective

1.1. Background and Context

The three case study areas are in Borana region of Ethiopia, Isiolo County in Eastern Kenya and Katakwi/Napak border region in North Eastern Uganda. Each case involves Each case studies a conflict that has a long history, and which has had adverse impacts on grazing patterns of the affected pastoralists and thereby constrained their coping strategies and resilience.

The **Ethiopian case study** reports on the on-and-off conflicts in Borana that have pitted the Borana against the Garre, the Guji and the Konso. The Borana community inhabit Borana administrative zone, parts of Guji zone and wide areas of northern Kenya. The Guji, Gabra, Garri and Konso inhabit the Borana lowlands. Some of these latter groups like the Guji and the Gabra have strong historical and ethnic links with the Borana, as well as regular, present day social interchanges. They have long coexisted with Borana under the traditional negotiated system of shared management of natural resources, resolving conflicts between them through traditional conflict resolution mechanisms.

In recent years, however, violent conflict between these groups has become common. Conflicts peaked over the last decade with the Torbi atrocities of 2005. These conflicts, though taking place at local levels, have involved complex legal, political and economic dynamics that extend from local to national, and even regional dimensions encompassing the communities and their allies elsewhere in Ethiopia and across the border in Kenya. Even where there are no direct clashes between communities, periodic killings continue to occur, creating insecurity and forcing households to emigrate with their livestock. For instance, large numbers of Gabra have moved with their livestock from Borana administrative zone of the Oromia Regional State to Udet and Moyale Districts of the Somali Regional State.

The **Kenyan case study** investigates and analyses conflict within the dry season grazing area around Kisima Hamsini/Kom situated at the convergence of Samburu East, Wajir, Isiolo and Marsabit districts access to which is claimed by Borana, Samburu, Rendile and Somali pastoralists. The case study seeks to clarify the link between conflict over grazing land in Kisima Hamsini/Kom and similar conflicts around Koya on the border between Laisamis and Samburu East, and how the two conflicts are impacted upon by the establishment of conservancies in the area by the Northern Rangelands Trust.

The **Ugandan case study** investigates and analyzes recurrent conflict along the border between Katakwi district in Teso and Napak district in Karamoja, which has rendered what used to be dry season grazing areas for Karamoja pastoralists inaccessible to them. The

conflict and its manifestations are further complicated by government policy which views the area as a green belt and seeks to promote large scale agricultural production there. The case study examines the implications of this government policy for the way authorities have managed the conflict.

1.2. Study methodology

The study was undertaken through case studies conducted at three locations spread across the three countries of Ethiopia, Kenya and Uganda. The case studies generated primary and secondary data through a variety of methods and approaches. Primary data was generated through key informant interviews as well as focus group discussions, while secondary data was generated principally through a review of literature and reports of relevant peace and development actors involved in conflict prevention and peace building work in the study areas.

Key informants were selected from among elders and other opinion leaders within the communities, local functionaries of government including administrators, range management, and law enforcement officers, members of civil society and development partners active in the region and within the communities. Focus Group Discussions (FGDs) were conducted at local level with selected groups representing leaders of traditional institutions (men and women) of the relevant communities as well as local peace and community based organizations.

FGDs were used to collect diverse views from the people who have been affected by the conflict. Information was collected on the history of each conflict, its impact and community perceptions about it. The FGDs further fostered interactions and exchange of information and ideas among different social groups according to gender, social class and age. Elders, women, men, youth and the most at risk populations were targeted for the FGDs.

Key informant interviews and FGDs were conducted on the basis of semi structured questionnaires. Some Participatory Research Appraisal (PRA) tools were employed for local level data collection. Information that helps to understand the background and history of the conflict situation identify primary and secondary parties to the conflicts, as well as factors that underpin the conflicts was gathered using conflict analysis tools.

1.2.1 Challenges and limitations

The study as conceptualized by was extremely ambitious with a wide and diverse scope. To properly manage and implement it as such would have required a research team with an

equally diverse technical orientation including, at a minimum, a social scientist, socio-economist and a conflict analyst, complemented with skills in policy research, livestock/range/production and marketing, environmental and gender issues. Moreover, that kind of study would take longer periods in the field than the one week that was available for this study.

The short time for the case studies and the fact that they were scheduled to begin during the week immediately before Christmas festivities posed a major challenge and limited what was achievable in the field. Both the timing and the period available imposed a constraint on constrain the planning, organization and carrying out of meetings with communities and other stakeholders. In particular, civil servants and employees of development organizations and civil society organizations were not easy to pin down at the case study locations in the period leading to Christmas, when those who are not indigenous to these locations travel to their homes for the holidays.

Transport arrangements for the field work were made through FAO Country offices, which also posed serious challenges largely because of the timing. The need to reconcile the timetable for the field work with the logistical imperatives of country offices interfered with the plans for the field work. Indeed, the Ethiopia case study was delayed to the new year as a result of these challenges.

The study was also subject to a major challenge that all conflict studies invariably face, namely, the un-predictability of the conflict situation on the ground. For obvious and good reasons (e.g. recent violent conflicts, outstanding resolutions, fear of retaliatory attacks amongst others), communities involved in conflict are suspicious and sometimes anxious about ‘strangers’ who ask questions about the respective conflicts. This is particularly the case where there has been no adequate investment in obtaining community buy-in into the purposes and objectives of such a study. Unfortunately, the building of such trust is a slow process that requires time which was not available in the context of this particular study.

Nevertheless, every effort was made to ensure that the study is conducted appropriately and adequate data generated to respond to the objectives. In any case, the study should be understood to be an exploratory undertaking to map out the issues in question, and create a foundation for more detailed research where this is considered necessary. The respective consultants were familiar with the study areas and had experience and linkages with local actors that helped mitigate many of the identified challenges.

2. Ethiopia Case study

The Ethiopia case study area was the conflict inhabited by the Garre and Borana in South Eastern Ethiopia bordering Borana Zone and Somali Region. Administratively these areas are bounded by Udet and Moyale Region 5 districts and Arero, Dhas, Moyale and Miyo districts of Borana Zone. It is a vast wet season grazing area commonly grazed by Borana, Gabra, Guji and Garre. It is also the dry season grazing area for Borana and Guji pastoralist of Guji Zone. During dry season pastoralist of Liban and Saba Boru district of Guji Zone cross Dawa River and use this same area (see map, below).

The area is renowned for the quality of its grass and shrubs species that are most nutritious for both cattle and camels. Its soils and temperature are said to improve cattle fertility and increase milk yield. The area is also rich in incense and bees for honey. In recent times, the area has been identified by the Oromia Regional Government for its potential irrigable lands.

There are at least fifteen different pastoral groups living in Borana Zone. The dominant groups are the Oromo and the Somali. Following the implementation of the decentralization programme, the boundaries of the region were redrawn. The area to the west, which is mainly inhabited by the Oromo is Borana Zone and part of Oromiya, while the area to the east, which is mainly inhabited by the Somali is part of the Somali Nation.

Of the Oromo groups, the Borana are by far the most dominant. There are also Guji and Arsi, though these are located more in the highland areas. In the lowlands, another Oromo group important to this research is the Gabra, who are among the minority groups. There are two Gabra groups, the Gabra Miigo and the Gabra Malbe. The Gabra Miigo is the main Gabra group in Ethiopia (Schlee, 1989). They are found in pockets in the region between Yabello and Agara Maryam, around Arero, around Moyale, and around Negele Borena. There used to be a population in the area between Wachile and Web, but these people are currently displaced from that area, and are living around Arero, Moyale and Yabello (Surupa). Other groups in the region include the very small Waata Wondo, a marginalized group of craftspeople, who also speak Oromo.

Although they are a minority in terms of the numbers resident in Borana Zone, the Somali have a significant presence influence on the natural resource management. The Garre important Somali-speaking group as far as this study is concerned. They are found in Somalia Kenya and Ethiopia. They have many cultural links to the Borana, and many of them are bilingual, speaking both Somali and Oromo (Schlee, 1989; Bassi, 1997; Getachew, 1996). The other Somali groups in Borana Zone include the Digodi, Marihan, and Gurre.

In addition to being means of livelihood, the camel and cattle play a symbolic role in each group's sense of identity and social interaction, including payment of bride-price. Moreover, the reliance on the different animals has important practical implications because cattle need significantly more water and grass than camels. While, cattle must be watered every two to three days, camels can be watered after seven to fourteen days (Gufu, 1998). Cattle also rely on grass, whereas camels and other stock forage leaves from bushes.

The land tenure among the Borana is communal, with the land being vested the community, specifically under the custodianship of the historical clans of Heero Abba Biyya who are called Choqorsa (meaning "roots"), said to have taken up residence in the region more than five centuries ago (Oba, 1998). Tenure to wells is individual, but not in exclusive sense. Instead, property rights to wells are defined by varying categories of user right.

Wells are the property of clan of the person who initiated the digging ceremony. Each well has a manager who controls access and use of the well through a defined rotational system. The position one takes in the order of access to the well depends on their relationships with the person who initiated the digging ceremony. Other people can procure access to Borana wells by contributing bulls to feed labor for well excavation. Everyone is enjoined to respect their position in the rotational use of the wells. The position is a life-long entitlement, which is passed on to descendants.

The Borana have strong social institutions that govern how members of the community relate with each other and with neighbouring communities. A complex web of entitlements enables an individual to gain access to key resources such as water. Each individual has a determined place in the rotational use of wells to water animals, based on clan membership and other considerations such as contribution to the labor of constructing the well. Access to wells to water animals is organized according to a predetermined priority based on seniority in the clan. Because access to water is central to pastoral livelihoods, the rules that govern it are closely linked to the survival of the community. It is forbidden to deny water to anyone, including members of neighbouring communities such as Gabra and Garre. It is also forbidden to ask them to pay for it (Boku, 2000).

2.1. Conflict between the Borana and other communities in the case study area

Although occasional conflicts between the Borana and neighbouring communities have been part of the history of inter-community relations in the past, the frequency and severity of inter-community conflicts has increased in recent years. In the past decade, the Borana and

Gabra have engaged in violent conflicts over the past decade. Such conflicts, though manifesting themselves at local levels, end up into a complex web of social, legal, political and economic dynamics that extend from local to national and regional dimensions.

Even where no direct clashes have occurred between the communities, cases of intermittent killings across the communities have been reported. This has created insecurity that has forced a significant number of Gabra households to move with their livestock from Borana Administrative Zone in Oromia Regional State to Udet and Moyale Districts of the Somali Regional State.

Historical relationships between the Garre and the Borana are long and complex. There have also been serious tensions and sporadic violent conflicts between the two groups. In recent times the relations between the Borana and the Garre have been characterized by conflict, caused largely by disputes over regional borders. The two communities are in disagreement over the south eastern border of Oromiya Region (which is also the Border of Borana lowlands and the adjacent Somali Region). The Borana claim to have lost land that includes important traditional wells as a result of recent changes to regional borders. The Garre claim that the land originally belonged to them. Table 1 lists some of the major conflicts in the area since 1990.

Table 1: Major conflicts in the area since 1990

Period	Place	Parties involved
1990	Gofa, Wachile, Raaroo	Borana v. Gabra, Garre
1992	All over Borana region	Borana v Garre
1992 - 1993	Madar, Orotoo, Wachile, Udet, Borbor, Gobso	Borana v Garre
1993		Borana v. Guji, Garre
1997 - 1998	Areas bordering Borana/Guji/Galaba	Borana v. Guji
2000	Areroo	Borana v. Gabra
	Lae	Borana v. Garre, Sarawit
2001	Dhas	Borana, v. Garre
2002	Ley, Gofa, Udet, Amiko, Dambala, Wachu	Borana v. Garre
2002 - 2003	Tate, Guchi, Moyale	Borana v. Garre, Gabra
2004	Orothoo, Wachile, Dhas, Mata, Arba	Borana v. Garre

These conflicts have rendered certain areas of grazing land along the disputed areas inaccessible, creating tensions and insecurity. The conflicts pose significant difficulties to

traditional grazing patterns. They disrupt nomadic grazing movement patterns and restrict the communities' coping strategies against adversity and drought, thereby increasing their vulnerability to shocks.

Conflict between the Borana and Somali groups dates back to the period of Italian occupation. The Italian army employed and armed Somali 'irregulars' who following the defeat of the Italians turned their guns on the Borana, literally threatening the Borana in Liben with extermination.

During the Ethio-Somali Ogaden war of 1973, the Borana lost access to a complex of wells around Lae and Goof as well as the surrounding grazing lands as a result of the insecurity caused by the Somali Abbo Liberation Front (SALF) which was spearheaded by the Garre. When additional Somali were settled in the area in 1986, the ethnic demography of the region changed to the detriment of the Borana who effectively became a minority in their own land (Bassi, 1997)

Following the fall of the Siad Barre regime in Somalia in 1991, large number of Somali, many of them heavily armed, crossed into Ethiopia and settled around Lae and Goof in the neighbourhood of the Borana. Many more Somali moved further west into Borana territory (Helland, 1998).

Borana land use strategies contributed significantly to the success of Somali encroachment into and occupation of Borana land. Whereas the Somali move as families, the Borana make use of land on and off. When the Borana moved out of the wet season and into the dry season rangelands, the Somali groups occupied the wet season rangelands, resisting the return of the Borana. Through this persistent pressure they succeeded in removing Borana from over two-third of their traditional grazing lands.

Over time, the Garre and other Somali groups gained control over territory and wells, which have since been consolidated, partly by the redrawing of the boundaries of the new administrative regions (Getachew, 1996; Bassi, 1997). The Borana preferring to settle the conflict continuously appealed to the Ethiopian Administrations.

The Borana have a longer history of peace with the Gabra. According to Aba Gada Liban Jaldessa ten years ago the Borana and the Gabra lived together (*Wherever there are Borana, there are Gabra. They speak the same language. They know no other land than the wone we*

share)¹ sharing pastures and water and resolving conflicts between them peacefully through community institutions.

Notwithstanding the rosy picture depicted by the Aba Gada, there have existed intermittent conflicts between the Borana and the Gabra dating back to the mid-1950s. Following a drought that decimated Borana livestock, they started fought the Gabra to raid camels for purposes of restocking. The same happened following the great drought of 1960-1968 (known in Borana as *Gobba Bulle*), which impoverished a large number of Borana households.

To protect themselves against the Borana, the Gabra joined SALF spearheaded by the Garre which infiltrated to the present areas of Moyale, Dhas, Wachile, and Udet. As a result the Gabra got better organized and received military training in Mogadishu, marking the beginning of the alliance of Gabra with Somali groups especially the Garre.

Following the defeat of the SALF by Ethiopian military forces, large numbers of Gabra and Garre fled into Kenya and Somalia. In 1969, the governments of Ethiopia signed an agreement for the return of all Gabra refugees to Ethiopia. Not all the Gabra returned to Ethiopia. A group remained in Kenya, while those that had fled into Somalia remained there.

The Gabra who returned to Ethiopia settled around Qadaduma, and Lae. Others were settled by the government of Ethiopia in different parts of Borana such as Dhokole, Silala and Surupha. An incident involving the killing of three Gabra and Garre returnees at Dire, Moyale and Negelle resulted in the offenders being condemned to death and shot in public on market days in the three locations. This death penalty led to peace between the two communities that lasted until the fall of the Derg in 1991.

Conflicts between the Borana and the Gabra erupted afresh following the introduction of the regionalization policy. Since the two communities have lived in persistent conflict resulting in a number of Gabra fleeing Silala and Karagumata to neighboring Garre areas of Udet in Region Five. Over time there has been a shift of alliances, with the Gabra now associating more with the Garre and seeing the Borana as the enemy.

2.2. Causes of conflicts

Traditionally, conflicts involving pastoralists were generally quite straightforward in terms of their causes and manifestations. They were localized both in terms of the protagonists and their overall impact. It was thus possible to resolve them using community mechanisms.

¹ Fekadu Abate personal interview with the Aba Geda

However, currently conflicts are much more complex in their causes and involve many more players, some of them situated long distances away from the locations of conflict. This is true of the conflicts involving the Borana and their neighbours.

The major causes of conflicts between different ethnic groups in Borana Zone are identified by most informants to include: disputes over political and administrative boundaries and borders (between regions/zones), competition over resource, ethnic or clan rivalries, weakness of governance and rule of law structures, communal revenge attacks, cattle raids and counter-raids. Of these, differences over political and administrative boundaries are the most important factor in conflicts between the Borana and the Garre, while ethnic rivalries and revenge are the most important factor as between the Borana and the Gabra. Competition for access to resources is blamed for conflicts between the Borana and the Konso who are farmers.

Conflicts between the Borana and the Garre that are engendered by disputes over political and administrative boundaries are blamed largely on competing elite interests. Politics motivated dispute over administrative territory dispute. The elite of the two communities instigate conflicts between their communities to push the agenda for competition for political dominance. Communities are effectively used as proxies in the pursuit of the political agenda of the respective elites. In the process an expansionist agenda is pursued by both communities. Control of the economy and through it the politics of Negelle and Moyale are part of the strategies pursued by the elite in this regard.

Whatever the causes of the conflicts may be, their persistence is blamed on the failure of governance and the rule of law. On the one hand, traditional governance systems have been weakened by statutory structures. On the other hand, modern structures of government are not adequately represented within pastoral areas and are thus ineffective in containing conflict and enforcing the rule of law. Informants complained that when disputes arise, there is no prompt response by the authorities in charge of security. In some cases, government institutions are ineffective because they are seen to take sides in disputes and conflicts.

2.3. Attempts at conflict resolution

Various efforts have been made to find lasting solutions to the conflicts in Borana Zone. During the time of the Emperor, a Tribal Convention was adopted to control grazing rights, and provide for the sharing of the rangelands between the Borana and neighbouring

communities (Oba, 1998). The Derg for its part used the threat of death penalty to maintain relative peace between the communities in Borana as stated above.

The current government has taken various measures that include establishment of local level administrative frameworks mandated to resolve inter-ethnic conflict, and decentralization policy to empower citizens and devolve decision making. Although these efforts have resolved some problems, many conflicts still persist in Borana Zone and other places, most of them involving pastoral communities.

Other efforts worthy of note include the **Dukana/Makona community led cross border peace initiative** that brought peace between the Borana and the Gabra in June 2006 and created stability along the Ethiopia/Kenya border, which has lasted for more than years. The **Halona Declaration** has been widely adopted and applied in the wider Borana and its surroundings to resolve intermittent conflict among ethnic groups in the area. The **Negelle Borana Peace Conventions** were developed by representatives of ethnic groups residing in three pastoralist Zones of Borana, Guji and Liben of Somali and Oromia Region, with the active participation of representatives of Regional and the Federal government.

Major actors involved in conflict resolution include government, Non-Government Organizations (NGOs), Community-Based Organizations (CBOs), Faith-Based Organizations (FBOs) and traditional institutions. They undertake peace building and conflict transformation

interventions to enhance cooperation and peace dialogue among different conflicting ethnic groups in the Borana area.

Such interventions include

organization of

peace conferences, support to the establishment of local peace committees, building the capacity of local peace structures (peace committees, traditional institutions, local government

- Action for Development (AFD)
- Action Contra la' Faim (ACF)
- Agri-Service Ethiopia (ASE)
- Catholic Organization for Relief and Development Aid (CORDAID)
- Ethiopian Agro-Pastoralist Development Association (EAPDA)
- European Commission Humanitarian Aid Office (ECHO)
- Food and Agriculture Organization of the United Nations (FAO)
- Gayo Pastoral Development Initiative (GPDI)
- Lay Volunteers International Association (LVIA)
- Mercy Corps (MC)
- Oromia Pastoral Association (OPA)
- Pastoralist Community Development Project (PCDP)
- Save the Children United States (SC-USA)
- United States of Agency for International Development (USAID)
- World Vision Ethiopia (WVE)
- Oromia Pastoral Areas Development Commission (OPaDC)

administration), providing training on participatory conflict prevention resolution and management, civic education and fostering exchange visits for local peace actors to learn from counterparts elsewhere in the country. Box 2 lists the major development actors that have been actively involved in conflict management and peace building in the area.

The interventions for conflict resolution and peace building are based on both traditional and approaches. It is however acknowledged that traditional mechanisms are the most appropriate in dealing with the root causes of conflict and establishing sustainable peace. Experience has shown that peace agreements founded on traditional systems and mediated by traditional institutions are the ones that have the most legitimacy and the highest chances of success (Abate, 2010; 2011, Amsalu, 2010).

A number of challenges continue to undermine these efforts at conflict management and peace building, resulting in their failure to prevent reoccurrence of violent conflict and ensure sustainable peace and stability in the area. Informants complained that interventions often focus on achieving temporarily cessation of hostility without addressing the underlying causes of conflict. As a result, such interventions are no more than firefighting actions. They fail to establish mechanisms for monitoring and follow up. They also decried the absence appropriate permanent institutional frameworks for coordination of peace efforts to ensure harmony among peace actors to avoid duplication s of efforts and pool resources for a process-oriented, integrated and comprehensive intervention backed by well-established community based monitoring and evaluation mechanisms.

Informants also identified lack of capacity on the part of local peace structures as a constraint to sustainable peace. Peace structures were said to lack capacity in terms of finance or logistics to effectively monitor conflict situations to identify early warning indicators and make appropriate rapid response interventions. Even local administrative structures of Woredas in conflict prone areas lack such capacity, and are thus not in a position to provide support for community based peace structures.

2.4. Impact of conflict on communities' resilience

The sustainable use of pastoral rangelands depends in large measure on mobility, which allows for rotational use of wet and dry season grazing areas. Mobility is the first and major casualty of conflict as the resulting insecurity forces the community to concentrate livestock within a fraction of its former territory. Loss of access to grazing land and water sources puts the pastoral system under pressure and gradually reduces its self-sufficiency. This means that

the land use system is no longer able to respond to ecological and climatic variability resulting in ecological degradation.

The increased ecological degradation is evident in the level of bush encroachment, which in turn changes the structure and composition of the herbaceous vegetation. The aggressive encroachment of undesired thorny and woody species on grazing areas result in an imbalance in the grass bush ratio and a decrease in biodiversity and carrying capacity causing severe economic and ecological losses to pastoral communities. According to Amsalu (2010) about 90 percent of households in Borana and Guji indicated that they have noticed changes in the condition of rangelands over time. Most of the high potential grazing areas are heavily degraded. In the course of this study, key informants asserted that bush encroachment is the single most important factor degrading rangeland resources.

These changes have had adverse impacts on the quality of livestock and their productivity. Many families in Borana are no longer able to depend entirely on livestock keeping as the basis of their livelihoods. Instead, they are converting grazing lands into farmlands and communal land into private pasture reserves in order to ameliorate increasing grazing pressure and food insecurity.

The communal nature of these conflicts mean that they perpetuate polarization of the affected communities, undermine social networks and historical links and create trans-generational animosities that undermine opportunities for development for the concerned communities while also jeopardizing national integration and economy. The resulting insecurity engenders loss of opportunities for the concerned communities as resources that could be used to improve economic and social opportunities and directed at security and peace building operations, while potential partners for development are discouraged from investing in the communities.

2.5. Local coping strategies

In spite of the persistence of conflict in the pastoral areas of Borana Zone, local pastoralists continue with their lives, struggling to cope as best they can. Their traditional institutions and systems of mutual social support provide the main framework for coping with the situation. When grazing lands are lost, arrangements are made to share existing grazing lands. Where access to wells is lost, arrangements are made to excavate new ones or rehabilitate those that had fallen into disuse.

Increasingly, pastoralists are responding to the loss of rangelands by adopting farming as a means of enhancing food security. Growing crops is perceived as a coping strategy to lessen the demand on cattle for food. Communal rangelands are further enclosed to develop fodder banks in order to cope with feed scarcity. More recently, the Borana have started investing their earnings in urban housing and trade as a means of diversifying income.

Efforts are also being made to rearrange settlement so as not to interfere with indigenous grazing management that allocates different landscapes to different economic activities. This enables the communities to separate grazing areas from farmlands and reserve areas for dry season feed development. While this sits well with the current government strategy which seeks to settle communities, reduce the number of livestock per household and limit mobility in order to promote a more intensive natural resource management system, the underlying motivation as between government and communities are not necessarily the same.

Development agencies are also supporting communities to develop strategies for coping better with conflict. These include support to livelihoods diversification, training on rehabilitation and maintenance of water points, improvement of feed supply through the harvesting, processing, treatment and conservation of locally available feed resources, improving management and use of natural resources, livestock marketing, and strengthening traditional range management systems, addressing food security issues.

2.6. Extent to which programming is conflict sensitive

Informants generally conceded that there is little or no attention paid to conflict in the planning of development interventions. Some development actors contended that it was impossible to do conflict sensitive programming with the limitations imposed on them by the law on Charities and Societies. Others blamed the situation on lack experience and skills on conflict sensitive programming.

Some projects were reported to have supported training on the *Do No Harm* approach, but there was no evidence of actual implementation through integration of conflict into development interventions. Unfortunately, this failure means that certain development interventions risk triggering new conflict or exacerbating existing ones.

One FGD reported that conflict had occurred between the Borana and the Garre as a result of an attempt to implement a water development intervention in a disputed area between the two communities. The water drilling machine was bombarded, resulting in the destruction of a nearby school.

2.7. Recommendations for the way forward

A number of recommendations were generated through the discussions held with key informants and through the FGDs for better management of conflict to improve the resilience of pastoralists. Among the key recommendation were the following:

1. Peace actors and development agencies to change their approach from passive fire-fighting to proactive and effective conflict mitigation. To this end, peace actors and development agencies should be equipped with adequate understanding of the root causes of conflict rather merely focusing on its nature and manifestations.
2. There is need for greater coordination and synergy between all peace stakeholders - individuals, groups, institutions, government, NGOs, civil society organizations (CSOs) and the international community for more effective cooperation. This should lead to a more process oriented and systematic approach to conflict management and peace building, involving all actors working at different levels.
3. Ultimately, conflicts manifest failure of law enforcement. As such strengthening the rule of law and its enforcement to ensure that individuals and groups are held accountable for their action is central to the success of conflict management and peace building efforts.
4. Development agencies should integrate conflict resolution and management in their projects and programmes, so that in their implementation local capacities are built to minimize tension between the different ethnic groups. In this connection the Do No Harm approach should be vigorously implemented by UN agencies such as FAO as well as their implementing partners.
5. Projects designed to be implemented in conflict prone areas pay special attention to their possible impact on conflict in terms of the contribution to the strengthening of local peace capacity, minimizing tension and maximizing mutual benefit to conflicting parties.

3. Kenya case study

The Kenya case study focused on the dry season grazing area around Kisima Hamsini/Kom area in Eastern Province, which is at the convergence of Samburu East, Wajir, Isiolo and Marsabit districts. The area is traditionally used by the Borana, Samburu, Rendile and Somali pastoralists for grazing, but its use has been constrained by conflict over the years. The case study investigated the nature of the conflict in this area and how it has impacted on the use of the rangelands and on relations between the neighbouring pastoralist communities. An effort was made to clarify the link between conflict over this specific grazing area in Kisima Hamsini/Kom and similar conflicts around Koya on the border between Laisamis and Samburu East, and how the two conflicts are impacted upon by the establishment of conservancies in the area by the Northern Rangelands Trust.

The Kisima Hamsini²/Kom Area is a dry season reserve grazing area situated at the convergence of Isiolo, Marsabit, Samburu East and Wajir districts. It operates as a last resort drought refuge for pastoralists for the Somali community from Isiolo, Borana from Garbatula and Merti, Samburu from Wamba Maralal and Baragoi, and Rendile from Laisamis and Marsabit. During severe droughts, like the one experienced in 2011, the area also hosts the Turkana from Isiolo and Somali (Degodia and Aajuran) pastoralists from Garissa and Wajir districts. It is reported that pastoralists from as far as Moyale also migrate into the area³.

The area has perennial natural springs, a remarkable geographical feature in a dryland area. According to Samburu elders, there are water points located at Sabarwawa, Kauro, Kom, Sereolipi, Merti, Laresero and Lokuamor. There are no permanent resident communities in the area. During the rainy season the pastoralist communities have plenty of water and pasture in their home districts where they remain. During this time, the pasture in area regenerates and is in abundance.

Indeed, when the weather is favourable with sufficient rains in the region, Kisima Hamsini/Kom area can, except for limited wildlife, remain uninhabited for up to two years. As grazing resources diminish with the onset of the dry spell, pastoralists from the different communities gradually move towards the area. In most cases the grazing resources in the area are sufficient to support both resident and migratory populations of both livestock and wildlife during the dry season⁴.

² Kiswahili for “fifty wells”

³ According to Mr John Kipsiwa, District Officer 1 (DO1) Merti District

⁴ Per Lordman Lekalkuli, Community Development Programme Officer, ALRMP

resources. Samburu elders on the other hand, trace the conflicts to a longer history, observing that the history went back to 1962 at a place called Kauro/Kom where one Samburu family was wiped out by the Borana in an act of revenge for theft of a herd of cattle. The elders further noted that the conflicts have picked up since July 2009 with the Samburu constantly fighting the Borana, the Turkana fighting the Borana and the Rendile also in conflict with the Borana.

An interesting observation was that the conflicts also arose from differences in natural resource management approaches and practices and the lack of adherence to established rules and regulations on resource use (see Box 1). Other factors that were cited as engendering conflict include poaching, boundary disputes, conflict beneficiaries (including development organizations) and an apparent bias by government towards issues, notably, in its pursuit to serve its self-interests. On the part of the communities, illiteracy, ignorance, poverty, underdevelopment, lack of alternative livelihoods, monetization of cattle rustling, and the proliferation of illicit small arms and light weapons were blamed for increased conflicts.

Conflicts were said to be most prevalent at the onset of the rainy/wet season. As communities begin to depart Kisima Hamsini/Kom for their home territories, they loot their rivals' livestock to restock their own. Furthermore, during the rainy season, youth who would have otherwise been engaged in the search for water and pasture are idle and have time to engage in conflicts/raids.

Resource Management Approaches

The Samburu have a well-structured natural resource management system commonly known as 'Ramat e Nkop' covering resources ranging from water sources, pasture, trees and livestock. Pasture, water and livestock (cattle, shoats and more recently camels) are considered crucial resources for the survival of the community. All natural resources - pasture, land, water, trees and livestock - are under the control and access of men - elders (Lpayiani).

Among the Borana, land is communally owned and the community controls land resources through a council of elders (Jaarsa dedha), which ensures equal rights and access to the resources by every member of the Borana community. If disputes arise at the watering points (well or dams) the matter is referred to the council of elders. Prior to any movement of livestock, intense negotiations over access to water and pasture are held between the respective elders.

Among the Somali, there is no fixed system that regulates the ownership of pasture because they believe that pasture is a gift from God. There are no rules governing ownership of the pasture either by lineage groups (Diya) or clans, a factor that leads to endemic conflicts over the unregulated water and pasture. The Somali pastoralists are aware of the need to preserve natural resources for their survival but, the corporate nature of clan organizations - existing as autonomous units with no overarching authority - often leads to competitive exploitation of the resources in disregard of environmental conservation imperatives.

3.2. Impacts of conflict

Conflicts in the case study area have resulted in insecurity that undermines the entire fabric of the society. They contribute to a breakdown in societal values, undermine coping mechanisms thereby engendering general economic decline. Food insecurity and lack of essential amenities are also created by conflict. Conflicts also contribute to degradation of the rangelands as mobility is constrained and the institutions that traditionally ensure their sustainable use are rendered ineffective. The associated breakdown of law and order has a spiraling effect on virtually all aspects of life.

Insecurity arising from the conflicts has accorded criminals an opportunity to smuggle in and trade in illicit firearms. The fact that communities with homes bordering Somalia, a country in conflict, migrate into the reserve grazing area is a further opportunity as certain elements within the community are willing conduits for illicit trade in smuggled goods, including firearms.

The conflicts have resulted in the breakdown of contacts between communities. Traditional social networks that could be used to address the conflicts have collapsed. The death of large numbers of men involved in the conflicts, as is evident from mass graves in Kisima Hamsini/Kom area, have changed established family roles. Women have to assume additional responsibilities on top of their arduous workload of providing for the family.

The collapse of pastoralist livelihoods leads to large out-migration and displacement of communities, leading to destitution, idleness, abuse of substances e.g. alcohol and khat (miraa), particularly among the youth. Such youth - already disgruntled by other challenges like unemployment - are a potential reservoir for violence that can be (and is usually) exploited by selfish conflict entrepreneurs (politicians, crooked businessmen etc.).

The 'appropriation of violence by the youth has had a serious effect on the normative framework and traditional hierarchy in the society, where the elders are expected to have a modeling influence' over their activities but are now overwhelmed by their defiance.

The collapse of coping mechanisms occasioned by persistent conflict undermines local and ultimately national economies. To survive after the loss of livelihoods triggered by the breakdown of coping mechanisms, people resort to detrimental undertakings including the sale of assets, destruction and vandalizing of infrastructure, while able bodied members of society migrate to urban centres in search of menial jobs.

It was reported that as a result of violent conflicts, a trading centre, a dispensary and a school in Kisima Hamsini/Kom area were closed. The once thriving livestock market is no longer operational even when the communities migrate to the reserve grazing area. Similarly, the costs of essential commodities are exorbitant both as a result of high costs of business (transport, security etc.) as well as exploitation by unscrupulous individuals who know the people have limited alternatives.

Large-scale cattle rustling currently prevalent in the pastoralist areas are a major cause of destitution among pastoralists as they cause much more rapid and focused damage than drought. Unlike drought, large-scale raiding jeopardizes customary strategies for risk distribution, animal-loss management and restocking and when directed at numerous homesteads simultaneously may decimate an individual's livestock in a few hours and leave destitute the whole network of dependents, friends and relatives, who might have represented a source of help in mitigating food insecurity.

Key informants in Kula Mawe (Borana) indicated that due to insecurity, grazing of livestock, even in times perceived to be peaceful, is restricted to a radius of 15 kilometres for fear of raids orchestrated by either the Somali or Samburu. The concentration of livestock in limited places results in overgrazing and general degradation of the environment.

Pastoralists who lose their livestock in raids turn to other income generating enterprises e.g. making charcoal. This is evident by the number of people selling charcoal along the Isiolo-Marsabit road and in particular around Archers Post. Cutting down trees to make charcoal has serious negative environmental and ecological impacts especially in an already fragile environment.

Conflicts and the resulting general breakdown of law and order have witnessed a steep rise in poaching activities in the area. The Kisima Hamsini/Kom area hosts big numbers of wildlife including elephants, giraffes, zebra, ostriches, different types of antelopes among others. These animals, and especially the big ones, are threatened by poachers. The poaching kingpins – mostly Somali according to various informants including the district security personnel - are from outside the area but they contract locals (armed youth) to kill the animals and remove the tusks, horns, skins etc. Poaching is reported to have picked up since the completion of sections of the Isiolo-Marsabit road, as it is now easier and faster to get out of the area and transport the poached loot out of the district.

3.3. Conflict management mechanisms

Efforts aimed at managing the conflicts include both traditional and modern approaches.

Traditional institutions and systems of conflict resolution were noted to be functioning with relative effectiveness. Indeed at the time of visit to the area it was reported that elders from the Boran community in Merti had been sent to Samburu East to negotiate for grazing rights. Borana elders are said to retain considerable influence over their youth. However, Samburu and Rendille elders are reported to have lost control of their youth.

Where traditional institutions have lost their influence, this is blamed on interference and watering down of their authority by the influence of educated youth, District Peace Committees, government and politicians. In addition, the grassroots people who are most affected by the conflict and those who understand issues best - i.e. youth, women and herders - are usually left out in the conflict resolution processes. Even worse is when the government appears to deliberately favour some communities over others.

NGOs are also blamed for commercializing the role of elders in traditional institutions through the introduction of monetary incentives for attendance at meetings and other functions. Sitting allowances, trips, invitations to workshops and such other incentives are said to be corrupting traditional institutions and undermining the authority of elders.

Plans are afoot to establish community negotiated grazing committees (or pasture management committees) specifically for the Kisima Hamsini/Kom area to complement the District Peace Committees (DPC). The grazing/pasture committees will be representative and will be charged with the tasks of developing rules and regulations on grazing resource access and use. While the intention here may be good, unless due regard is had to the role and place of traditional institutions in the matter, this may well serve as another instant of interference that ultimately undermines the effectiveness of traditional systems.

The Regional Commissioner also indicated that plans are underway to institute a requirement that the herders who depend and move to Kisima Hamsini/Kom area during the stress periods migrate with their local chiefs. This is a noble suggestion but the question remains whether these chiefs will be freshly recruited and if not what happens to their areas of jurisdiction back home after they move towards the dry grazing reserves.

Modern approaches to conflict management and peace building involve institutions and structures established by government either on its own or in collaboration with other peace actors such as development partners and NGOs. DPCs are probably the most important such

institution. Under the direction of the National Steering Committee on Peace-building and Conflict Management (NSE), the DPCs are local mechanisms that bring together different stakeholders to work with government agencies, including those in charge of law enforcement and security to spearhead conflict management and peace-building initiatives through elaborate networks at the community level that provide a basis for early warning and rapid response. While the DPCs face numerous operational challenges, the most severe being under resourcing, they are doing a commendable job in close collaboration with local administrators.

Specific to the Kisima Hamsini/Kom area is what is dubbed the *KOM Peace Initiative*. In 2011 as the severity of the drought became manifest, elders from different communities met and agreed that all the communities affected by the drought should be allowed to access and graze their livestock in Kisima Hamsini/Kom area. This gave birth to KOM 3, which was a follow-up to KOM 2 and 1 - meetings bringing together different stakeholders with interests in Kisima Hamsini/Kom area. The meetings (KOM 1, 2 and 3) were facilitated by three CBOs, namely: PEEPS supporting the Rendile from Laisamis; CODES supporting the Samburu and the Merti Integrated Development Programme (MID-P) supporting the Borana; all with funding support from CORDAID.

3.4. Coping strategies

The following coping strategies were noted in Kisima Hamsini/Kom area:

1. There is a deliberate shift from keeping cattle and sheep to rearing camels and goats. The latter two adapt better to drought. In addition they are largely browsers and can survive even on the few twigs available during drought.
2. There is increasing commercialization of pastoralism. This involves keeping and fattening a few animals and later selling them at much higher profits than they would otherwise fetch while still roaming. Pastoralist Women for Health and Education (PWH&E) and Pastoralist Resource Management and Advocacy Programme (PREMAP) are among organizations spearheading this innovation in Isiolo district.
3. Educated and relatively wealthy people are migrating to trading and urban centres and adopting new livelihoods and income generating activities in trade and services. While this may be good for the individuals, it is detrimental to the communities left behind as it robs them of the necessary and required capacities to facilitate development in the area.

4. Wildlife conservancies are increasingly catching up as a coping strategy, spearheaded by the Northern Rangeland Trust (NRT). So far, the Trust has facilitated the establishment of seven conservancies in the region

3.5. Perceptions about the future of pastoralism

It was evident from discussions with key informants and other stakeholders that pastoralism faces innumerable challenges. However, there was general agreement that the practice is here to stay, not least because it remains the most appropriate livelihood and production system for the Arid and Semi-Arid Lands (ASALs). Nevertheless, it was also evident that pastoralism is transforming and adapting to generational, local, national and global changes.

Many of the key informants saw climate change as one of the most serious threats to pastoralism. Drought and its subsequent repercussions has decimated their livestock and consequently livelihoods. Survival for them is a continuous struggle especially given the general prevailing insecurity. They have resulted to dependence on external relief from government and other well-wishers. How long this can go on is debatable. In any case, such dependence is an insult to their culture and dignity.

Education is also seen to contributing to the erosion of interest in pastoralism especially among the youth. As they leave school, youth are attracted to urban life and the search for other types of occupations. They are leaving their old parents who are growing weaker with age to continue with the difficult job of pastoralism.

Pastoralism will nevertheless continue to survive on the strength of tested approaches to herding e.g. traditional pasture management, livestock management, and conflict resolution among others. But these need to be complemented with resource sharing mechanisms between and among different pastoralist communities. These communities should look at the grazing resources as common and not a source of contestation between rivals. All this should be accompanied by the right education for the youth who should be taught the importance of livestock and urged to embrace the livelihood.

Diversification of pastoralism has shown positive gains. In particular, he notes that those farming along the Ewaso Nyiro River are reaping good returns. Some enterprising people are fishing (mud-fish) along Ewaso Nyiro River and selling the products to external markets in Meru and Isiolo town. Success has also been shown by those who are now engaged in only fattening of livestock and selling it after it has gained weight instead of rearing the animals.

3.6. Recommendations for the way forward

The following recommendations arose from the interactions with key informants and other stakeholders:

1. Devolution of power to the County level should be used to enhance the active participation of pastoralists in development planning to ensure projects and programmes are supportive and relevant to their livelihoods.
2. , The role played by the Ministry of State for Development of Northern Kenya and other Arid Lands through ALRMP was appreciated and it is hoped that its capacity can be enhanced to enable it to respond better to development needs of the region.
3. Communities would like to see the land demarcated to avoid conflicts between different communities. Demarcation is seen as a means of protecting the land from unscrupulous land grabbing and invasion as well as appropriation by the government without proper consultations and compensation.
4. Government should ensure enforcement of rules and regulations governing the management of pasture and water. Movement into the dry season grazing zones should be strictly regulated through a grazing/migration calendar complemented with reliable early warning/early response mechanisms.
5. Establishment of conservancies should be rationalized to ensure that they do not compromise the communities grazing and migration needs.
6. Conflict resolution efforts should seek to deal with the root causes and not just the symptoms of the conflicts. They should be gender sensitive especially as the women, youth and the elderly are increasingly being left out of important decision making processes and they, particularly the youth, are significant stakeholders in the conflicts.
7. Innovative ways should be devised on how to involve and incorporate the politicians in conflict resolution processes, because they are at the heart of the conflicts.
8. Traditional structures and approaches of conflict resolution should be supported. Extensive consultations should be made regarding, which traditional approaches need to be promoted as some of them are retrogressive and/or one community specific. Opinion leaders and elders in the community should be involved in any review of the traditional structures of governance.

9. Legal provisions should be enacted to recognize traditional governance structures/approaches and reconcile them with modern approaches.
10. DPCs should be restructured to ensure more involvement of the people at the grassroots level - herders, women and the youth.

4. Uganda case study

The Ugandan case study area was the border between Katakwi district in Teso and Napak district in Karamoja. This is a conflict area that pits the Iteso against the Karimojong. The former are the inhabitants of Katakwi while the latter inhabit Napak. The two are historically members of the Nilo Hamitics group of tribes that settled with their into what is now North Eastern and Eastern Uganda after migrating from what is now Ethiopia. Legend has it that what was originally one group divided up into two once they reached the foothills of Mount Moroto, when drought and famine ensued and the possibility of moving further on was discussed. Young men in the group were in favor of migrating to other places, while the older men resisted and urged them not to do so, worried that the young men would be killed by hostile tribes or be eaten by wild animals.

In the arguments, the young men mocked their fathers (elders) “Akar Imojong” meaning “old men stay behind”. The old men in turn called the young men “Atesia” meaning graves. In the end the Akar imojong remained settled near Mt. Moroto in the region presently known as Karamoja sub-region. Later, they acquired the name Karimojong (tired old men). The young men moved southwards where they finally called themselves Iteso.

Conflict between the two communities is founded largely on cattle rustling and competition for access to strategic pastoral resources. It is reported that once the two communities settled in the two locations, they enjoyed a cordial relationship. The Itesot allowed the Karimojong to graze and water their livestock in Teso during dry seasons. However cattle raids by the Karimojong against the Iteso starting between 1945 and 1950 changed the picture. Strict measures were put into place by the then colonial District Commissioner to control the raids, including patrols by colonial soldiers and establishment of a post at Omoro. These measures restricted movement of the Karimojong into Teso resulting the souring of relations between the two communities that have continued to-date.

Although the study focused on the conflict between the Karimojong and the Itesot, it important to appreciate that the conflict is part of complex web of related conflicts that extend over much of Karamoja. Many of these conflicts have subsided over time, but occasional skirmishes still erupt every once in a while. Other related conflicts have involved:

- The Pian in Nakapiripirit and Bokora in Napak;
- The Jie from Kotido and Bokora of Nakapiripirit;
- The Jie against Bokora, Dodoth, Matheniko; and
- The Matheniko and Pokot and the Jie

4.1. Main causes of conflict in the area

The root causes of the conflict along the boundary between Karamoja and Teso have been summed up as environmental scarcity and stress, colonial marginalisation and the post-colonial containment policy towards Karamoja, lack of clear demarcation of the Katakwi-Napak districts border, and the imperatives of mobile pastoralism on the part of the Karimojong (ACODE, (2007). These causes have been further complicated by politicisation of the border issues by political actors on both sides who seek to make political capital during elections; general political instability in Uganda; lack of land policy with a clear land conflict management mechanism and the availability of arms in the region. The politicization of the issue is further compounded by the long history between the two communities, which have ended up evolving in different directions, to the extent that the Karimojong now accuse the Itesot of exhibiting a superiority complex against them on the basis of their higher levels of education and modernization.

Lack of water for cattle and humans in Karamoja region drives people to migrate to Teso where there are permanent sources of water. These scarcities have been exacerbated by climate change in recent years. That the Karimojong cherish the practice of keeping large numbers of cattle does further complicates the situation. Opportunists in Karamoja take advantage of the border conflict to sustain the practice of cattle rustling, backed by the ready availability of light weapons and small arms in Karamoja.

4.2. Impacts of the conflict on the two communities

The conflict between the two communities has had substantial impact for both of them. Among other impacts, it has increased poverty and insecurity leading to food insecurity and constraining social and economic development, perpetuated ethnic mistrust and animosity, undermined law and order as well as the functioning of traditional institutions, systems and networks, and for the Karimojong it has perpetuated stereotypes about them that compound their marginalization and isolation.

The conflict has resulted into underdevelopment of both Napak and Katakwi districts. In Katakwi, hundreds of people are internally displaced, their livelihood opportunities undermined. People's ability to produce adequate food stocks for subsistence and sale have been undermined, leading to food insecurity. The conflict has perpetuated traditional hatred and rivalry between the two related communities, thereby undermining opportunities for the region to develop and move forward.

The spread of light weapons and small arms in Karamoja has caused a serious rupture in social order. It has contributed to the decline of traditional authority and other cultural institutions that held the society together and ensured peace and tranquillity. It has also undermined the rule of law, mainly as a result of failure by government to invest adequately in governance, social and physical infrastructure.

The locations most affected by the conflict are found in the subcounties of Iriiri, Nabilatuk and Lolachat. In these areas the conflict has denied the pastoralists access to strategic, rich and nutritious rangelands. They have been forced to settle in concentrated areas leading to ecological degradation that in turn undermines their livelihoods.

Loss of access to some of the resources in the rangelands has affected the community's ability to cope with droughts and other climate related disasters in several ways. It has led to congested settlements resulting into loss of soil cover due to soil erosion. There is also scarcity and overuse of water by large numbers of people and livestock. Over-cultivation has led to overuse of soil resulting in loss of soil fertility, food insecurity, deforestation and biomass depletion which is also partly exacerbated by the cutting of trees and grass for building, firewood, charcoal burning for domestic use and sale for income generation. The need for income leads to burning of trees for charcoal and cutting of grass for sale. In addition, the loss of far off relationships because people fear to move to other places to meet their friends and relatives has led to loss of social security networks and safety nets.

4.3. Coping strategies

Communities employ different strategies for coping with loss of access to strategic resources. At times the pastoralists take the risk and travel to the rangelands, prepared for the prospect of violence, especially during droughts when they have no alternatives. At other times they seek the support of government in the form of security as they water and pasture their livestock.

The government has constructed boreholes and dams for the people to compensate for the loss of water sources. Shallow wells are dug along river banks for use during the dry session. Water harvesting methods are used to trap running water during wet or rainy session. It was also reported that communities hold peace talks amongst themselves in order to be allowed to use the resources in another community. However this is only possible among communities that have friendly relations, within Karamoja.

Peace talks are occasionally held between the conflicting communities to try and mend fences, with mixed results. A number of NGOs in the area facilitate community arrangements

to cushion conflicts in the rangeland areas. Uganda Land Alliance in collaboration with Dan Church Aid assists the communities in Iriiri sub-county to map their land boundaries through a project on community mapping. The project assists the Karimojong to demarcate their land and acquire certificates. It is hoped that apart from reducing conflict over boundaries the project will help enhance the value of the land to attract resources for development from financial institutions. This will help in diversifying livelihoods as communities adopt farming practices along the green belt that lies between the two communities.

4.4. Conflict sensitive development planning

It was reported that projects implemented in the area are conflict sensitive, although most of them are focused on social service provision and livelihood support. There are however a number of projects that specifically address conflict prevention, management and resolution as well as peace building.

On the Karamoja side, Moroto Nakapiripirit Religious leaders Initiative for Peace (MONARLIP) and CLIDE have facilitated peace dialogues and community meetings. Northern Uganda Social Action Fund (NUSAF) implements development projects which address some of the root causes of conflicts. It also facilitates peace talks and training. Happy Cow conducts sensitization of the communities about better methods of cattle keeping so that people do not go for cattle raiding (hence their *Happy Cow Happy People* slogan). It has also organized peace meetings between Lopeduru community and their neighbours the Bokora of Iriiri.

On the Teso side and across the two communities, Centre for Conflict Resolution (CECORE) implemented a project with local partners in Teso and Karamoja in partnership with the Teso Initiative for Peace (TIP) that facilitated a series of consultative and training workshops for cross-section of the communities in the two districts with their political leaders and security officials to interrogate the root causes of the conflict and agree on strategies for bringing it to an end. The project also facilitated kraal leaders (elders) and warriors to participate in a study tour to other parts of Uganda to see how other cattle-keeping communities manage to coexist with their non-pastoralist neighbours; and how they have adopted alternative livelihoods to diversify their sources of income. They were also taken to the Democratic Republic of Congo (DRC) and to witness how local communities across international borders interact peacefully in their day to day life. Advocates Coalition for Development and Environment (ACODE) has conducted research and generated information on the Teso-Karamoja border land conflict. The findings of these studies were disseminated at higher level dialogue meetings held in

Kampala and Mbale, and copies of the reports widely distributed for the public to benefit from the findings.

4.5. Community perceptions about the future of pastoralism

The Karimojong see pastoralism as closely tied to their cultural identity and livelihoods security. Livestock and livestock products play a significant role in the community. But they are concerned about emerging challenges and threats to pastoralism as a livelihood and land use system. Conflicts, the association of pastoralism with insecurity, the spread of light weapons and small arms, violence and backwardness, the negative perception of the community by its neighbours, restriction of mobility, population growth both within Karamoja and in the neighbouring districts, the shrinking of the rangelands through the introduction of competing land uses, climate change and other numerous factors are increasingly making the practice of pastoralism unsustainable. Coupled with a hostile policy and institutional environment at the national level, these factors have undermined the confidence of the Karimojong about their future.

The numbers of livestock holding within the community have decreased significantly, and this is resulting in changes in herding practices. Many households no longer have enough numbers of livestock to justify mobility over long distances. Some households have no livestock at all and are resorting to farming, especially within the study area where there is significant potential for crop production.

Education and the influence of modernization is also having an impact on the viability and continued relevance of pastoralism. Young educated Karimojong end up in jobs in Kampala, Mbale and other urban centres and have little motivation to take up pastoralism. With increased security following disarmament and the heavy presence of the military in Karamoja, informants see other opportunities for livelihoods and income emerging that will further erode the appeal of pastoralism.

4.6. Recommendations on the way forward

The study generated recommendations for different actors to improve conflict management and peace building in the study area. Specific recommendations were made for government, civil society, local leader, and traditional institutions.

The following are the key recommendations for the government:

1. encourage and facilitate frequent and regular peace meetings and dialogues between the communities;

2. organize and facilitate exchange meetings between communities, districts and where possible inter-state exchange meetings.
3. Continue the disarmament exercise until all guns are removed from Karamoja and sustainable peace is firmly established
4. pursue a policy of confidence building in Karamoja to remove the mistrust between the people and the government and erase the stereotyping of the community by the rest of the country
5. Undertake a participatory and comprehensive demarcation of the Katakwi – Napak border which is the main cause of conflict between the two regions
6. Both central and local governments should have specific budgets and plans for conflict prevention, management and resolutions, and ensure conflict sensitive planning of all development projects in the area

Civil society organizations have played a critical role in the search for lasting peace between the two communities as well as in helping the communities cope with the impacts of conflict. They should redouble their efforts in this regard and:

1. Continue to organize and facilitate peace meetings and dialogues;
2. Support the provision of social services such as roads, markets, schools and health centres which can encourage interactions between communities;
3. support initiatives that will enable the leaders and people of the two regions to re-establish contact, trust, confidence and engage in face to face dialogue.

Local political leaders were said to have failed to provide the leadership needed to bring about lasting peace and prosperity in the region. They should mobilize community members to appreciate social, economic development initiatives by government, community and other development actors rather than inciting ethnic hatred.

Traditional authority by elders and men in the kraals is important in supplementing the work of law and order institutions in Karamoja. For them to be more effective in this regard, efforts should be made to restore the traditional authority of elders. Capacity building initiatives should be implemented to enable traditional leaders to better appreciate current realities of governance, resource management and development and how their roles can be reconciled to those of government institutions and other modern frameworks.

5. Conclusions and recommendations

This report provides a summary of the findings of three case studies conducted in Ethiopia, Kenya and Uganda to investigate and analyze how persistent conflict impacts on the resilience of pastoral and agro-pastoral communities, and to capture perceptions of communities about the future of pastoralism in these context and their ideas on how to comprehensively address conflicts and build lasting peace for livelihoods security and economic development in the region. The specific conclusions and recommendations for each case study area are presented in the respective sections of the report.

In general the report affirms that conflict is a major threat to the sustainable practice of pastoralism in the region. The case studies illustrate the long history of these conflicts, which have persisted in spite of efforts to address them over the years. It is evident that the persistence of these conflicts demonstrates the failure of governance and the rule of law, which in turn is a function of long-standing marginalization of pastoralist areas by the respective government as evidenced by the failure to establish functional governance and rule of law frameworks in these regions. That failure has encouraged the emergence of local conflict entrepreneurs that take advantage of the conflict situations to advance their own political and business interests and thus frustrate any efforts to find lasting solutions to the conflicts.

The most far reaching impact of the conflicts is that that they undermine livelihoods and opportunities for social and economic transformation. In contexts that are inherently difficult, these conflicts undermine proven coping strategies of the communities principally by restricting mobility, which is critical for the sustainable management of the ASALs. They also undermine the operations and effectiveness of traditional institutions and systems with their social networks within and across neighbouring communities that have traditionally facilitated negotiated access to strategic natural resources, especially in times of ecological stress.

The conflicts and their impacts on the one hand, and the ill-advised and often non-consultative, top-down interventions by governments and other development actors have undermined the confidence of communities on the future of pastoralism as a livelihood and land use system. This has the result of creating hopelessness within these communities, which know that pastoralism is the most appropriate way for them to make use of the ASALs and at the same time see many restrictions and constraints placed in their path by

inappropriate policies and interventions as well as other natural factors that they are increasingly unable to manage.

Going forward, there is need for more deepened understanding of these and other conflicts involving pastoralists in order to be able to design strategies that shall address their root causes. This can only be done effectively by engaging local people and their institutions and making them an integral part of the search for solutions. This will require long-term investment and commitment on the part of government and development partners. It also requires that development interventions in these areas be planned in a manner that is sensitive to the realities of conflict. In this connection, capacity building on conflict sensitive development as well as implementation is needed for all development actors working in these areas, and for the communities and their institutions.

FAO is well-placed to provide support for this given its global mandate, resources and experience as well as its influence with the three governments. While the case studies show that these conflicts are essentially local, their regional ramifications are evident especially in all the three countries given the cross-border nature of some of the communities involved. As such, a regional approach to reflection and strategy for addressing the root causes of the conflicts is called for. The three governments need to share experiences and strategies to this end. FAO can competently facilitate such sharing through its regional programmes in support of pastoral and agro-pastoral communities in the Horn of Africa.